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no_llseek had been defined to NULL two years ago, in commit 868941b14441
("fs: remove no_llseek")
To quote that commit,
At -rc1 we'll need do a mechanical removal of no_llseek -
git grep -l -w no_llseek | grep -v porting.rst | while read i; do
sed -i '/\<no_llseek\>/d' $i
done
would do it.
Unfortunately, that hadn't been done. Linus, could you do that now, so
that we could finally put that thing to rest? All instances are of the
form
.llseek = no_llseek,
so it's obviously safe.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull timer updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"Core:
- Overhaul of posix-timers in preparation of removing the workaround
for periodic timers which have signal delivery ignored.
- Remove the historical extra jiffie in msleep()
msleep() adds an extra jiffie to the timeout value to ensure
minimal sleep time. The timer wheel ensures minimal sleep time
since the large rewrite to a non-cascading wheel, but the extra
jiffie in msleep() remained unnoticed. Remove it.
- Make the timer slack handling correct for realtime tasks.
The procfs interface is inconsistent and does neither reflect
reality nor conforms to the man page. Show the correct 0 slack for
real time tasks and enforce it at the core level instead of having
inconsistent individual checks in various timer setup functions.
- The usual set of updates and enhancements all over the place.
Drivers:
- Allow the ACPI PM timer to be turned off during suspend
- No new drivers
- The usual updates and enhancements in various drivers"
* tag 'timers-core-2024-09-16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (43 commits)
ntp: Make sure RTC is synchronized when time goes backwards
treewide: Fix wrong singular form of jiffies in comments
cpu: Use already existing usleep_range()
timers: Rename next_expiry_recalc() to be unique
platform/x86:intel/pmc: Fix comment for the pmc_core_acpi_pm_timer_suspend_resume function
clocksource/drivers/jcore: Use request_percpu_irq()
clocksource/drivers/cadence-ttc: Add missing clk_disable_unprepare in ttc_setup_clockevent
clocksource/drivers/asm9260: Add missing clk_disable_unprepare in asm9260_timer_init
clocksource/drivers/qcom: Add missing iounmap() on errors in msm_dt_timer_init()
clocksource/drivers/ingenic: Use devm_clk_get_enabled() helpers
platform/x86:intel/pmc: Enable the ACPI PM Timer to be turned off when suspended
clocksource: acpi_pm: Add external callback for suspend/resume
clocksource/drivers/arm_arch_timer: Using for_each_available_child_of_node_scoped()
dt-bindings: timer: rockchip: Add rk3576 compatible
timers: Annotate possible non critical data race of next_expiry
timers: Remove historical extra jiffie for timeout in msleep()
hrtimer: Use and report correct timerslack values for realtime tasks
hrtimer: Annotate hrtimer_cpu_base_.*_expiry() for sparse.
timers: Add sparse annotation for timer_sync_wait_running().
signal: Replace BUG_ON()s
...
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There are several comments all over the place, which uses a wrong singular
form of jiffies.
Replace 'jiffie' by 'jiffy'. No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Anna-Maria Behnsen <anna-maria@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> # m68k
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240904-devel-anna-maria-b4-timers-flseep-v1-3-e98760256370@linutronix.de
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Current AMD systems can report MCA errors using the ACPI Boot Error
Record Table (BERT). The BERT entries for MCA errors will be an x86
Common Platform Error Record (CPER) with an MSR register context that
matches the MCAX/SMCA register space.
However, the BERT will not necessarily be processed on the CPU that
reported the MCA errors. Therefore, the correct CPU number needs to be
determined and the information saved in struct mce.
Use the newly defined mce_prep_record_*() helpers to get the correct
data.
Also, add an explicit check to verify that a valid CPU number was found
from the APIC ID search.
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240730182958.4117158-4-yazen.ghannam@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
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Generally, MCA information for an error is gathered on the CPU that
reported the error. In this case, CPU-specific information from the
running CPU will be correct.
However, this will be incorrect if the MCA information is gathered while
running on a CPU that didn't report the error. One example is creating
an MCA record using mce_prep_record() for errors reported from ACPI.
Split mce_prep_record() so that there is a helper function to gather
common, i.e. not CPU-specific, information and another helper for
CPU-specific information.
Leave mce_prep_record() defined as-is for the common case when running
on the reporting CPU.
Get MCG_CAP in the global helper even though the register is per-CPU.
This value is not already cached per-CPU like other values. And it does
not assist with any per-CPU decoding or handling.
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240730182958.4117158-3-yazen.ghannam@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
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There is no MCE "setup" done in mce_setup(). Rather, this function initializes
and prepares an MCE record.
Rename the function to highlight what it does.
No functional change is intended.
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240730182958.4117158-2-yazen.ghannam@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 cpu model updates from Borislav Petkov:
- Flip the logic to add feature names to /proc/cpuinfo to having to
explicitly specify the flag if there's a valid reason to show it in
/proc/cpuinfo
- Switch a bunch of Intel x86 model checking code to the new CPU model
defines
- Fixes and cleanups
* tag 'x86_cpu_for_v6.11_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/cpu/intel: Drop stray FAM6 check with new Intel CPU model defines
x86/cpufeatures: Flip the /proc/cpuinfo appearance logic
x86/CPU/AMD: Always inline amd_clear_divider()
x86/mce/inject: Add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION() line
perf/x86/rapl: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
x86/boot: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
x86/cpu: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
perf/x86/intel: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
x86/virt/tdx: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
x86/PCI: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
x86/cpu/intel: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
x86/platform/intel-mid: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
x86/pconfig: Remove unused MKTME pconfig code
x86/cpu: Remove useless work in detect_tme_early()
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make W=1 C=1 warns:
WARNING: modpost: missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/mce-inject.o
Add the missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION().
Signed-off-by: Jeff Johnson <quic_jjohnson@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240530-md-x86-mce-inject-v1-1-2a9dc998f709@quicinc.com
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The recent CMCI storm handling rework removed the last case that checks
the return value of machine_check_poll().
Therefore the "error_seen" variable is no longer used, so remove it.
Fixes: 3ed57b41a412 ("x86/mce: Remove old CMCI storm mitigation code")
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240523155641.2805411-3-yazen.ghannam@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
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The MCA_MISC register is used to control the MCA thresholding feature on
AMD systems. Therefore, it is not generally part of the error state that
a user would adjust when testing non-thresholding cases.
However, MCA_MISC is unconditionally written even if a user does not
supply a value. The default value of '0' will be used and clobber the
register.
Write the MCA_MISC register only if the user has given a value for it.
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240523155641.2805411-2-yazen.ghannam@amd.com
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull RAS update from Borislav Petkov:
- Change the fixed-size buffer for MCE records to a dynamically sized
one based on the number of CPUs present in the system
* tag 'ras_core_for_v6.10_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/mce: Dynamically size space for machine check records
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 cpu updates from Ingo Molnar:
- Rework the x86 CPU vendor/family/model code: introduce the 'VFM'
value that is an 8+8+8 bit concatenation of the vendor/family/model
value, and add macros that work on VFM values. This simplifies the
addition of new Intel models & families, and simplifies existing
enumeration & quirk code.
- Add support for the AMD 0x80000026 leaf, to better parse topology
information
- Optimize the NUMA allocation layout of more per-CPU data structures
- Improve the workaround for AMD erratum 1386
- Clear TME from /proc/cpuinfo as well, when disabled by the firmware
- Improve x86 self-tests
- Extend the mce_record tracepoint with the ::ppin and ::microcode fields
- Implement recovery for MCE errors in TDX/SEAM non-root mode
- Misc cleanups and fixes
* tag 'x86-cpu-2024-05-13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (34 commits)
x86/mm: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
x86/tsc_msr: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
x86/tsc: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
x86/cpu: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
x86/resctrl: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
x86/microcode/intel: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
x86/mce: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
x86/cpu: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
x86/cpu/intel_epb: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
x86/aperfmperf: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
x86/apic: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
perf/x86/msr: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
perf/x86/intel/uncore: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
perf/x86/intel/pt: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
perf/x86/lbr: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
perf/x86/intel/cstate: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
x86/bugs: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
x86/bugs: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
x86/cpu/vfm: Update arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
x86/cpu/vfm: Add new macros to work with (vendor/family/model) values
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 cleanups from Ingo Molnar:
- Fix function prototypes to address clang function type cast
warnings in the math-emu code
- Reorder definitions in <asm/msr-index.h>
- Remove unused code
- Fix typos
- Simplify #include sections
* tag 'x86-cleanups-2024-05-13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/pci/ce4100: Remove unused 'struct sim_reg_op'
x86/msr: Move ARCH_CAP_XAPIC_DISABLE bit definition to its rightful place
x86/math-emu: Fix function cast warnings
x86/extable: Remove unused fixup type EX_TYPE_COPY
x86/rtc: Remove unused intel-mid.h
x86/32: Remove unused IA32_STACK_TOP and two externs
x86/head: Simplify relative include path to xen-head.S
x86/fred: Fix typo in Kconfig description
x86/syscall/compat: Remove ia32_unistd.h
x86/syscall/compat: Remove unused macro __SYSCALL_ia32_NR
x86/virt/tdx: Remove duplicate include
x86/xen: Remove duplicate #include
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New CPU #defines encode vendor and family as well as model.
[ bp: Squash *three* mce patches into one, fold in fix:
https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240429022051.63360-1-tony.luck@intel.com ]
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240424181511.41772-1-tony.luck%40intel.com
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Machine check SMIs (MSMI) signaled during SEAM operation (typically
inside TDX guests), on a system with Intel eMCA enabled, might eventually
be reported to the kernel #MC handler with the saved RIP on the stack
pointing to the instruction in kernel code after the SEAMCALL instruction
that entered the SEAM operation. Linux currently says that is a fatal
error and shuts down.
There is a new bit in IA32_MCG_STATUS that, when set to 1, indicates
that the machine check didn't originally occur at that saved RIP, but
during SEAM non-root operation.
Add new entries to the severity table to detect this for both data load
and instruction fetch that set the severity to "AR" (action required).
Increase the width of the mcgmask/mcgres fields in "struct severity"
from unsigned char to unsigned short since the new bit is in position 12.
Action required for these errors is just mark the page as poisoned and
return from the machine check handler.
HW ABI notes:
=============
The SEAM_NR bit in IA32_MCG_STATUS hasn't yet made it into the Intel
Software Developers' Manual. But it is described in section 16.5.2
of "Intel(R) Trust Domain Extensions (Intel(R) TDX) Module Base
Architecture Specification" downloadable from:
https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/733575
Backport notes:
===============
Little value in backporting this patch to stable or LTS kernels as
this is only relevant with support for TDX, which I assume won't be
backported. But for anyone taking this to v6.1 or older, you also
need commit:
a51cbd0d86d3 ("x86/mce: Use severity table to handle uncorrected errors in kernel")
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240408180944.44638-1-tony.luck@intel.com
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Modifying a MCA bank's MCA_CTL bits which control which error types to
be reported is done over
/sys/devices/system/machinecheck/
├── machinecheck0
│ ├── bank0
│ ├── bank1
│ ├── bank10
│ ├── bank11
...
sysfs nodes by writing the new bit mask of events to enable.
When the write is accepted, the kernel deletes all current timers and
reinits all banks.
Doing that in parallel can lead to initializing a timer which is already
armed and in the timer wheel, i.e., in use already:
ODEBUG: init active (active state 0) object: ffff888063a28000 object
type: timer_list hint: mce_timer_fn+0x0/0x240 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c:2642
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8120 at lib/debugobjects.c:514
debug_print_object+0x1a0/0x2a0 lib/debugobjects.c:514
Fix that by grabbing the sysfs mutex as the rest of the MCA sysfs code
does.
Reported by: Yue Sun <samsun1006219@gmail.com>
Reported by: xingwei lee <xrivendell7@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAEkJfYNiENwQY8yV1LYJ9LjJs%2Bx_-PqMv98gKig55=2vbzffRw@mail.gmail.com
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After
034ff37d3407 ("x86: rewrite '__copy_user_nocache' function")
rewrote __copy_user_nocache() to use EX_TYPE_UACCESS instead of the
EX_TYPE_COPY exception type, there are no more EX_TYPE_COPY users, so
remove it.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240204082627.3892816-2-tongtiangen@huawei.com
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Systems with a large number of CPUs may generate a large number of
machine check records when things go seriously wrong. But Linux has
a fixed-size buffer that can only capture a few dozen errors.
Allocate space based on the number of CPUs (with a minimum value based
on the historical fixed buffer that could store 80 records).
[ bp: Rename local var from tmpp to something more telling: gpool. ]
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Avadhut Naik <avadhut.naik@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240307192704.37213-1-tony.luck@intel.com
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull RAS fixlet from Borislav Petkov:
- Constify yet another static struct bus_type instance now that the
driver core can handle that
* tag 'ras_core_for_v6.9_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/mce: Make mce_subsys const
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 FRED support from Thomas Gleixner:
"Support for x86 Fast Return and Event Delivery (FRED).
FRED is a replacement for IDT event delivery on x86 and addresses most
of the technical nightmares which IDT exposes:
1) Exception cause registers like CR2 need to be manually preserved
in nested exception scenarios.
2) Hardware interrupt stack switching is suboptimal for nested
exceptions as the interrupt stack mechanism rewinds the stack on
each entry which requires a massive effort in the low level entry
of #NMI code to handle this.
3) No hardware distinction between entry from kernel or from user
which makes establishing kernel context more complex than it needs
to be especially for unconditionally nestable exceptions like NMI.
4) NMI nesting caused by IRET unconditionally reenabling NMIs, which
is a problem when the perf NMI takes a fault when collecting a
stack trace.
5) Partial restore of ESP when returning to a 16-bit segment
6) Limitation of the vector space which can cause vector exhaustion
on large systems.
7) Inability to differentiate NMI sources
FRED addresses these shortcomings by:
1) An extended exception stack frame which the CPU uses to save
exception cause registers. This ensures that the meta information
for each exception is preserved on stack and avoids the extra
complexity of preserving it in software.
2) Hardware interrupt stack switching is non-rewinding if a nested
exception uses the currently interrupt stack.
3) The entry points for kernel and user context are separate and GS
BASE handling which is required to establish kernel context for
per CPU variable access is done in hardware.
4) NMIs are now nesting protected. They are only reenabled on the
return from NMI.
5) FRED guarantees full restore of ESP
6) FRED does not put a limitation on the vector space by design
because it uses a central entry points for kernel and user space
and the CPUstores the entry type (exception, trap, interrupt,
syscall) on the entry stack along with the vector number. The
entry code has to demultiplex this information, but this removes
the vector space restriction.
The first hardware implementations will still have the current
restricted vector space because lifting this limitation requires
further changes to the local APIC.
7) FRED stores the vector number and meta information on stack which
allows having more than one NMI vector in future hardware when the
required local APIC changes are in place.
The series implements the initial FRED support by:
- Reworking the existing entry and IDT handling infrastructure to
accomodate for the alternative entry mechanism.
- Expanding the stack frame to accomodate for the extra 16 bytes FRED
requires to store context and meta information
- Providing FRED specific C entry points for events which have
information pushed to the extended stack frame, e.g. #PF and #DB.
- Providing FRED specific C entry points for #NMI and #MCE
- Implementing the FRED specific ASM entry points and the C code to
demultiplex the events
- Providing detection and initialization mechanisms and the necessary
tweaks in context switching, GS BASE handling etc.
The FRED integration aims for maximum code reuse vs the existing IDT
implementation to the extent possible and the deviation in hot paths
like context switching are handled with alternatives to minimalize the
impact. The low level entry and exit paths are seperate due to the
extended stack frame and the hardware based GS BASE swichting and
therefore have no impact on IDT based systems.
It has been extensively tested on existing systems and on the FRED
simulation and as of now there are no outstanding problems"
* tag 'x86-fred-2024-03-10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (38 commits)
x86/fred: Fix init_task thread stack pointer initialization
MAINTAINERS: Add a maintainer entry for FRED
x86/fred: Fix a build warning with allmodconfig due to 'inline' failing to inline properly
x86/fred: Invoke FRED initialization code to enable FRED
x86/fred: Add FRED initialization functions
x86/syscall: Split IDT syscall setup code into idt_syscall_init()
KVM: VMX: Call fred_entry_from_kvm() for IRQ/NMI handling
x86/entry: Add fred_entry_from_kvm() for VMX to handle IRQ/NMI
x86/entry/calling: Allow PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS being used beyond actual entry code
x86/fred: Fixup fault on ERETU by jumping to fred_entrypoint_user
x86/fred: Let ret_from_fork_asm() jmp to asm_fred_exit_user when FRED is enabled
x86/traps: Add sysvec_install() to install a system interrupt handler
x86/fred: FRED entry/exit and dispatch code
x86/fred: Add a machine check entry stub for FRED
x86/fred: Add a NMI entry stub for FRED
x86/fred: Add a debug fault entry stub for FRED
x86/idtentry: Incorporate definitions/declarations of the FRED entries
x86/fred: Make exc_page_fault() work for FRED
x86/fred: Allow single-step trap and NMI when starting a new task
x86/fred: No ESPFIX needed when FRED is enabled
...
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Now that __num_cores_per_package and __num_threads_per_package are
available, cpuinfo::x86_max_cores and the related math all over the place
can be replaced with the ready to consume data.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com>
Tested-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213210253.176147806@linutronix.de
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It's really a non-intuitive name. Rename it to __max_threads_per_core which
is obvious.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com>
Tested-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213210253.011307973@linutronix.de
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Switch it over to the new topology evaluation mechanism and remove the
random bits and pieces which are sprinkled all over the place.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Tested-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com>
Tested-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Wang Wendy <wendy.wang@intel.com>
Tested-by: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240212153625.145745053@linutronix.de
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AMD (ab)uses topology_die_id() to store the Node ID information and
topology_max_dies_per_pkg to store the number of nodes per package.
This collides with the proper processor die level enumeration which is
coming on AMD with CPUID 8000_0026, unless there is a correlation between
the two. There is zero documentation about that.
So provide new storage and new accessors which for now still access die_id
and topology_max_die_per_pkg(). Will be mopped up after AMD and HYGON are
converted over.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Tested-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com>
Tested-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Wang Wendy <wendy.wang@intel.com>
Tested-by: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240212153624.956116738@linutronix.de
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Now that the driver core can properly handle constant struct bus_type,
make mce_subsys a constant structure.
Suggested-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ricardo B. Marliere <ricardo@marliere.net>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240204-bus_cleanup-x86-v1-1-4e7171be88e8@marliere.net
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Like #DB, when occurred on different ring level, i.e., from user or kernel
context, #MCE needs to be handled on different stack: User #MCE on current
task stack, while kernel #MCE on a dedicated stack.
This is exactly how FRED event delivery invokes an exception handler: ring
3 event on level 0 stack, i.e., current task stack; ring 0 event on the
the FRED machine check entry stub doesn't do stack switch.
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205105030.8698-26-xin3.li@intel.com
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 TDX updates from Dave Hansen:
"This contains the initial support for host-side TDX support so that
KVM can run TDX-protected guests. This does not include the actual
KVM-side support which will come from the KVM folks. The TDX host
interactions with kexec also needs to be ironed out before this is
ready for prime time, so this code is currently Kconfig'd off when
kexec is on.
The majority of the code here is the kernel telling the TDX module
which memory to protect and handing some additional memory over to it
to use to store TDX module metadata. That sounds pretty simple, but
the TDX architecture is rather flexible and it takes quite a bit of
back-and-forth to say, "just protect all memory, please."
There is also some code tacked on near the end of the series to handle
a hardware erratum. The erratum can make software bugs such as a
kernel write to TDX-protected memory cause a machine check and
masquerade as a real hardware failure. The erratum handling watches
out for these and tries to provide nicer user errors"
* tag 'x86_tdx_for_6.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (21 commits)
x86/virt/tdx: Make TDX host depend on X86_MCE
x86/virt/tdx: Disable TDX host support when kexec is enabled
Documentation/x86: Add documentation for TDX host support
x86/mce: Differentiate real hardware #MCs from TDX erratum ones
x86/cpu: Detect TDX partial write machine check erratum
x86/virt/tdx: Handle TDX interaction with sleep and hibernation
x86/virt/tdx: Initialize all TDMRs
x86/virt/tdx: Configure global KeyID on all packages
x86/virt/tdx: Configure TDX module with the TDMRs and global KeyID
x86/virt/tdx: Designate reserved areas for all TDMRs
x86/virt/tdx: Allocate and set up PAMTs for TDMRs
x86/virt/tdx: Fill out TDMRs to cover all TDX memory regions
x86/virt/tdx: Add placeholder to construct TDMRs to cover all TDX memory regions
x86/virt/tdx: Get module global metadata for module initialization
x86/virt/tdx: Use all system memory when initializing TDX module as TDX memory
x86/virt/tdx: Add skeleton to enable TDX on demand
x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL error printing for module initialization
x86/virt/tdx: Handle SEAMCALL no entropy error in common code
x86/virt/tdx: Make INTEL_TDX_HOST depend on X86_X2APIC
x86/virt/tdx: Define TDX supported page sizes as macros
...
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Add an Intel specific hook into machine_check_poll() to keep track of
per-CPU, per-bank corrected error logs (with a stub for the
CONFIG_MCE_INTEL=n case).
When a storm is observed the rate of interrupts is reduced by setting
a large threshold value for this bank in IA32_MCi_CTL2. This bank is
added to the bitmap of banks for this CPU to poll. The polling rate is
increased to once per second.
When a storm ends reset the threshold in IA32_MCi_CTL2 back to 1, remove
the bank from the bitmap for polling, and change the polling rate back
to the default.
If a CPU with banks in storm mode is taken offline, the new CPU that
inherits ownership of those banks takes over management of storm(s) in
the inherited bank(s).
The cmci_discover() function was already very large. These changes
pushed it well over the top. Refactor with three helper functions to
bring it back under control.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231115195450.12963-4-tony.luck@intel.com
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This is the core functionality to track CMCI storms at the machine check
bank granularity. Subsequent patches will add the vendor specific hooks
to supply input to the storm detection and take actions on the start/end
of a storm.
machine_check_poll() is called both by the CMCI interrupt code, and for
periodic polls from a timer. Add a hook in this routine to maintain
a bitmap history for each bank showing whether the bank logged an
corrected error or not each time it is polled.
In normal operation the interval between polls of these banks determines
how far to shift the history. The 64 bit width corresponds to about one
second.
When a storm is observed a CPU vendor specific action is taken to reduce
or stop CMCI from the bank that is the source of the storm. The bank is
added to the bitmap of banks for this CPU to poll. The polling rate is
increased to once per second. During a storm each bit in the history
indicates the status of the bank each time it is polled. Thus the
history covers just over a minute.
Declare a storm for that bank if the number of corrected interrupts seen
in that history is above some threshold (defined as 5 in this series,
could be tuned later if there is data to suggest a better value).
A storm on a bank ends if enough consecutive polls of the bank show no
corrected errors (defined as 30, may also change). That calls the CPU
vendor specific function to revert to normal operational mode, and
changes the polling rate back to the default.
[ bp: Massage. ]
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231115195450.12963-3-tony.luck@intel.com
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When a "storm" of corrected machine check interrupts (CMCI) is detected
this code mitigates by disabling CMCI interrupt signalling from all of
the banks owned by the CPU that saw the storm.
There are problems with this approach:
1) It is very coarse grained. In all likelihood only one of the banks
was generating the interrupts, but CMCI is disabled for all. This
means Linux may delay seeing and processing errors logged from other
banks.
2) Although CMCI stands for Corrected Machine Check Interrupt, it is
also used to signal when an uncorrected error is logged. This is
a problem because these errors should be handled in a timely manner.
Delete all this code in preparation for a finer grained solution.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Tested-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231115195450.12963-2-tony.luck@intel.com
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The first few generations of TDX hardware have an erratum. Triggering
it in Linux requires some kind of kernel bug involving relatively exotic
memory writes to TDX private memory and will manifest via
spurious-looking machine checks when reading the affected memory.
Make an effort to detect these TDX-induced machine checks and spit out
a new blurb to dmesg so folks do not think their hardware is failing.
== Background ==
Virtually all kernel memory accesses operations happen in full
cachelines. In practice, writing a "byte" of memory usually reads a 64
byte cacheline of memory, modifies it, then writes the whole line back.
Those operations do not trigger this problem.
This problem is triggered by "partial" writes where a write transaction
of less than cacheline lands at the memory controller. The CPU does
these via non-temporal write instructions (like MOVNTI), or through
UC/WC memory mappings. The issue can also be triggered away from the
CPU by devices doing partial writes via DMA.
== Problem ==
A partial write to a TDX private memory cacheline will silently "poison"
the line. Subsequent reads will consume the poison and generate a
machine check. According to the TDX hardware spec, neither of these
things should have happened.
To add insult to injury, the Linux machine code will present these as a
literal "Hardware error" when they were, in fact, a software-triggered
issue.
== Solution ==
In the end, this issue is hard to trigger. Rather than do something
rash (and incomplete) like unmap TDX private memory from the direct map,
improve the machine check handler.
Currently, the #MC handler doesn't distinguish whether the memory is
TDX private memory or not but just dump, for instance, below message:
[...] mce: [Hardware Error]: CPU 147: Machine Check Exception: f Bank 1: bd80000000100134
[...] mce: [Hardware Error]: RIP 10:<ffffffffadb69870> {__tlb_remove_page_size+0x10/0xa0}
...
[...] mce: [Hardware Error]: Run the above through 'mcelog --ascii'
[...] mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check: Data load in unrecoverable area of kernel
[...] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal local machine check
Which says "Hardware Error" and "Data load in unrecoverable area of
kernel".
Ideally, it's better for the log to say "software bug around TDX private
memory" instead of "Hardware Error". But in reality the real hardware
memory error can happen, and sadly such software-triggered #MC cannot be
distinguished from the real hardware error. Also, the error message is
used by userspace tool 'mcelog' to parse, so changing the output may
break userspace.
So keep the "Hardware Error". The "Data load in unrecoverable area of
kernel" is also helpful, so keep it too.
Instead of modifying above error log, improve the error log by printing
additional TDX related message to make the log like:
...
[...] mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check: Data load in unrecoverable area of kernel
[...] mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine Check: TDX private memory error. Possible kernel bug.
Adding this additional message requires determination of whether the
memory page is TDX private memory. There is no existing infrastructure
to do that. Add an interface to query the TDX module to fill this gap.
== Impact ==
This issue requires some kind of kernel bug to trigger.
TDX private memory should never be mapped UC/WC. A partial write
originating from these mappings would require *two* bugs, first mapping
the wrong page, then writing the wrong memory. It would also be
detectable using traditional memory corruption techniques like
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC.
MOVNTI (and friends) could cause this issue with something like a simple
buffer overrun or use-after-free on the direct map. It should also be
detectable with normal debug techniques.
The one place where this might get nasty would be if the CPU read data
then wrote back the same data. That would trigger this problem but
would not, for instance, set off mechanisms like slab redzoning because
it doesn't actually corrupt data.
With an IOMMU at least, the DMA exposure is similar to the UC/WC issue.
TDX private memory would first need to be incorrectly mapped into the
I/O space and then a later DMA to that mapping would actually cause the
poisoning event.
[ dhansen: changelog tweaks ]
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231208170740.53979-18-dave.hansen%40intel.com
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Add HWID and McaType values for new SMCA bank types.
Signed-off-by: Muralidhara M K <muralidhara.mk@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231102114225.2006878-3-muralimk@amd.com
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The long names of the SMCA banks are only used by the MCE decoder
module.
Move them out of the arch code and into the decoder module.
[ bp: Name the long names array "smca_long_names", drop local ptr in
decode_smca_error(), constify arrays. ]
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231118193248.1296798-5-yazen.ghannam@amd.com
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AMD systems generally allow MCA "simulation" where MCA registers can be
written with valid data and the full MCA handling flow can be tested by
software.
However, the platform on Scalable MCA systems, can prevent software from
writing data to the MCA registers. There is no architectural way to
determine this configuration. Therefore, the MCE injection module will
check for this behavior by writing and reading back a test status value.
This is done during module init, and the check can run on any CPU with
any valid MCA bank.
If MCA_STATUS writes are ignored by the platform, then there are no side
effects on the hardware state.
If the writes are not ignored, then the test status value will remain in
the hardware MCA_STATUS register. It is likely that the value will not
be overwritten by hardware or software, since the tested CPU and bank
are arbitrary. Therefore, the user may see a spurious, synthetic MCA
error reported whenever MCA is polled for this CPU.
Clear the test value immediately after writing it. It is very unlikely
that a valid MCA error is logged by hardware during the test. Errors
that cause an #MC won't be affected.
Fixes: 891e465a1bd8 ("x86/mce: Check whether writes to MCA_STATUS are getting ignored")
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231118193248.1296798-2-yazen.ghannam@amd.com
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mce_device_create() is called only from mce_cpu_online() which in turn
will be called iff MCA support is available. That is, at the time of
mce_device_create() call it's guaranteed that MCA support is available.
No need to duplicate this check so remove it.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231107165529.407349-1-nik.borisov@suse.com
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Memory errors don't happen very often, especially fatal ones. However,
in large-scale scenarios such as data centers, that probability
increases with the amount of machines present.
When a fatal machine check happens, mce_panic() is called based on the
severity grading of that error. The page containing the error is not
marked as poison.
However, when kexec is enabled, tools like makedumpfile understand when
pages are marked as poison and do not touch them so as not to cause
a fatal machine check exception again while dumping the previous
kernel's memory.
Therefore, mark the page containing the error as poisoned so that the
kexec'ed kernel can avoid accessing the page.
[ bp: Rewrite commit message and comment. ]
Co-developed-by: Youquan Song <youquan.song@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Youquan Song <youquan.song@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhiquan Li <zhiquan1.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231014051754.3759099-1-zhiquan1.li@intel.com
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 core updates from Thomas Gleixner:
- Limit the hardcoded topology quirk for Hygon CPUs to those which have
a model ID less than 4.
The newer models have the topology CPUID leaf 0xB correctly
implemented and are not affected.
- Make SMT control more robust against enumeration failures
SMT control was added to allow controlling SMT at boottime or
runtime. The primary purpose was to provide a simple mechanism to
disable SMT in the light of speculation attack vectors.
It turned out that the code is sensible to enumeration failures and
worked only by chance for XEN/PV. XEN/PV has no real APIC enumeration
which means the primary thread mask is not set up correctly. By
chance a XEN/PV boot ends up with smp_num_siblings == 2, which makes
the hotplug control stay at its default value "enabled". So the mask
is never evaluated.
The ongoing rework of the topology evaluation caused XEN/PV to end up
with smp_num_siblings == 1, which sets the SMT control to "not
supported" and the empty primary thread mask causes the hotplug core
to deny the bringup of the APS.
Make the decision logic more robust and take 'not supported' and 'not
implemented' into account for the decision whether a CPU should be
booted or not.
- Fake primary thread mask for XEN/PV
Pretend that all XEN/PV vCPUs are primary threads, which makes the
usage of the primary thread mask valid on XEN/PV. That is consistent
with because all of the topology information on XEN/PV is fake or
even non-existent.
- Encapsulate topology information in cpuinfo_x86
Move the randomly scattered topology data into a separate data
structure for readability and as a preparatory step for the topology
evaluation overhaul.
- Consolidate APIC ID data type to u32
It's fixed width hardware data and not randomly u16, int, unsigned
long or whatever developers decided to use.
- Cure the abuse of cpuinfo for persisting logical IDs.
Per CPU cpuinfo is used to persist the logical package and die IDs.
That's really not the right place simply because cpuinfo is subject
to be reinitialized when a CPU goes through an offline/online cycle.
Use separate per CPU data for the persisting to enable the further
topology management rework. It will be removed once the new topology
management is in place.
- Provide a debug interface for inspecting topology information
Useful in general and extremly helpful for validating the topology
management rework in terms of correctness or "bug" compatibility.
* tag 'x86-core-2023-10-29-v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (23 commits)
x86/apic, x86/hyperv: Use u32 in hv_snp_boot_ap() too
x86/cpu: Provide debug interface
x86/cpu/topology: Cure the abuse of cpuinfo for persisting logical ids
x86/apic: Use u32 for wakeup_secondary_cpu[_64]()
x86/apic: Use u32 for [gs]et_apic_id()
x86/apic: Use u32 for phys_pkg_id()
x86/apic: Use u32 for cpu_present_to_apicid()
x86/apic: Use u32 for check_apicid_used()
x86/apic: Use u32 for APIC IDs in global data
x86/apic: Use BAD_APICID consistently
x86/cpu: Move cpu_l[l2]c_id into topology info
x86/cpu: Move logical package and die IDs into topology info
x86/cpu: Remove pointless eva |
